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In this age of bureaucratic proliferation it is hard to imagine any aspect
of our lives that is not somehow affected by government regulation. In
particular realms, the power of the government to regulate is regarded
not as an option but as a duty. The American legal system has tradition-
ally held that the protection of the public health is one of the first duties
of government,' and that there is no public policy more important than
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1. U.S. CONST., preamble, states: "We the People of the United States, in Order
to. . . promote the general Welfare. . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States of America." For a discussion of the government's responsibility to
protect the public health, see Tobey, Public Health and the Police Power, 4 N.Y.U.
L.REv. 126 (1927). The United States Supreme Court affirmed this tenet in Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888). Subsequently, a number of cases from various
jurisdictions have based their decisions on the premise that the protection of the public
health is one of the first duties of government. See, e.g., People v. Robertson, 302 II1.
422, 134 N.E. 815 (1922) (quarantine imposed by legislature held constitutional as an
exercise of government's duty to preserve the public health); Patrick v. Riley, 209 Cal.
350, 287 P. 455 (1930) (Bovine Tuberculosis law is designed to promote the public health
and is thus a matter on which the government is necessarily authorized to take action);
Central States Life Ins. Co. v. State, 80 S.W.2d 628 (Ark. 1935) (since one of the first
duties of government is the protection of the public health, funds set aside by legis-
lature to promote the public health is a necessary expense of any government, and thus
constitutional); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (it is the duty of Congress
to exclude from commerce articles which may be injurious to the public health or
welfare); Lewis Food Co. v. State Dept. of Public Health, 110 Cal. App.2d 759, 243
P.2d 802 (1st DCA 1952) (statute regulating the sale of horse meat is a reasonable
exercise of the government's duty to conserve the health of its citizens); Yaworski v.
Town of Canterbury, 21 Conn. Supp. 347, 154 A.2d 758 (1959) (ordinances relating to
garbage disposal are reasonable exercises of government's duty to safeguard the health
of its people); Ellis v. City of Grand Rapids, 257 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1966) (renewal
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the protection of citizens from practices which may injure their health.2
Historically, the promotion or protection of public health and
safety has been a matter particularly for the state government.3 Where
the federal government has acted to regulate a particular field of health
and safety, a state or local government cannot act 4 unless the state or
local regulation is consistent with and does not invalidate any section
of the federal law.5 If the federal government has not acted, the state is
free to legislate regulations, for a state has broad power to make and
enforce standards to promote the health of those within its borders.'
In the nQt too distant future, the promotion of the public health will
take on added meanings. Members of the human race will have wide-
and expansion of medical care centers through urban renewal projects is a public service
in accordance with the government's responsibility to protect the public health and
welfare).
2. See, e.g., 'State ex rel. Andergon v. Fadely, 180 Kan.652, 308 P.2d 537 (1957)
(statute authorizing allocations for the protection of persons and property from
"extraordinary conditions" should be liberally construed, since no obligation of govern-
ment is more important than the preservation of the public health); Friedlander v.
Cimino, M.D., 385 F. Supp. 1357 (D. D.C. 1974), rev'don other grounds and remanded,
520 F.2d 318 (2nd Cir. 1975) (proficiency testing programs for laboratories operated
by nonphysicians are essential to protect the public health, which is the most important
of all public policies).
3. Tobey, supra note 1. For cases, see, e.g., In re Seiferth, 137 N.Y.S.2d 35
(1955), rev'd on other grounds, 127 N.E.2d 820 (Ct. App. 1955) (Act ordering surgical
care of neglected children is valid, since the state has an enormous interest in the
physical and mental health of its inhabitants); Borough of West Caldwell v. Borough
of Caldwell, 138 A.2d 402 (N.J. 1958) (the power of the state government to regulate
and control public health and sanitation is an essential governmental function, and
cannot be surrendered or impaired by contract).
4. For preemption provision, see Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n., Inc. v. Low-
ery, 452 F.2d 431 (2nd Cir. 1971) (because in enacting the Federal Hazardous Sub-
stances Act, Congress used the phrase "precautionary labeling" in preemption provision
to refer to all labeling of hazardous substances covered by the Act, city regulations in
question are inconsistent with FHSA, and thus preempted).
5. See, e.g., Cohen v. Bredehoeft, 290 F. Supp. 1001 (1968), affd, 402 F.2d 61
(5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969) (city ordinance ordering the destruc-
tion of any fireworks within the city's jurisdiction is valid and enforceable where state
and federal statutes do not restrict the power of home rule city to enact such ordinances).
6. See, e.g., Barsky v. Board of Regents of University of State of New York,
N.Y., 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (New York State Education Law is not unconstitutional, as
the state has broad power to protect the public health); Stephens v. Dennis, 293 F. Supp.
589 (D.D.C. 1968) (a state has broad power to protect the health of its citizens; including
the plenary power to fix terms of admission into the practice of any profession con-
cerned with health).
2
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spread access to new technologies which will critically affect the public
health and safety: the biotechnologies of in vitro fertilization,7 recombi-
nant DNA,s and cloning.9 Since the potential effects of these techniques
could significantly transform our world and even life as we know it, the
public policy decisions made regarding their use are of great impor-
tance.
The effects of these biotechnologies are frequently fantasized in a
science-fiction like manner by the media and, as a result, are rarely
examined in a rational, systematic manner. The constitutional basis and
need for regulation in this field have been all but ignored. It is crucial,
however, that the constitutional ramifications of these technologies be
fully explored. Accordingly, it is the intent of the author to help fill this
void by formulating a solid constitutional framework for assessing the
implications of these three biotechnologies.
Part 1 focuses on the ninth amendment's guarantee of individual
rights in this area and Part 2 addresses the issue of the extent to which
the commerce clause can be invoked as a basis for government regula-
tion. In Part 3 a model for making constitutional public policy decisions
of a regulatory nature is proposed. Parts 4, 5 and 6 apply this model to
the biotechnologies of in vitro fertilization, recombinant DNA and clon-
ing, ultimately suggesting the extent to which government regulatory
policy is necessary and proper in each field.
1. THE ROLE OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
In matters of government regulation, the courts have assumed that
the power to regulate lies somewhere, whether it be with the federal,
state or local governments. This assumption has been based at least in
part on the tenth amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people."'10
The widespread preoccupation with the power of the government
to regulate has resulted in a failure to give the last words of the tenth
7. See text accompanying notes 93 through 96 infra for an explanation of this
technique.
8. See text accompanying notes 119 through 134 infra for an explanation of this
process.
9. See text accompanying notes 224 through 230 infra for an explanation of this
technique.
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amendment the attention they merit. The fact that this amendment
reserves powers to the people themselves, as well as the states, has been
largely ignored."
Furthermore, rights which preclude grants of power are also re-
served to the people 2 in the ninth amendment of the Constitution: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." 3
A. Historical Interpretations
Upon a preliminary reading, one might conclude that the ninth
amendment is a fountainhead of rights." Instead, this single sentence
has emerged over the years as a fountainhead of consternation and
controversy, and widely varying theories of interpretation have been
proposed.
Perhaps the predominant method of construing the ninth amend-
ment has been simply to avoid it. Feelings of uncertainty regarding how
to approach this cryptic amendment are common even among experts,
such as Mr. Justice Jackson: "[T]he ninth amendment rights which are
not to be disturbed . . . are still a mystery to me."' 5 Thus, rather than
wander into this uncharted territory, many constitutional scholars have
refrained from entering the mainstream of ninth amendment contro-
versy.
A second theory of interpretation was highlighted in Griswold v.
Connecticut," one of the few recent Supreme Court cases to deal with
the ninth amendment issue.'7 In. his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
11. Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 INDIANA L.J.
30( (1936).
12. Id. at 309.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
14. Kelley, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U.CHI. L.
REV. 814 (1966).
15. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT,
74-75 (1955).
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. Previous Supreme Court cases interpreting the ninth amendment are Ashwan-
der v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (the ninth amendment's insuring
of rights retained by the people does not negate the government's constitutional author-
ity to dispose of electric energy generated at the Wilson Dam); Tennessee Elec. Power
Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118 (1939) (the ninth amendment gives
power companies no standing to object to TVA power activities); United Public Work-
ers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding constitutionality of Hatch Act limitations
4
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Goldberg concluded that the ninth amendment is only a rule of con-
struction to apply to the Constitution as a whole. The Justice saw it as
a guidepost, the sole purpose of which was to call the courts' attention
to other portions of the Constitution, such as the due process clauses of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. While these selected portions
might then be used as a vehicle for unenumerated rights, the Justice did
not see the ninth amendment as a source of and vehicle for protecting
unenumerated rights in itself."8
B. A Positive Declaration of Unenumerated Rights
Even proponents of the above theories admit that they do not help
solve the problem of "where one draws the dividing line between...
the rightful exercise of. .. powers and unconstitutional infringement
of individual rights."" This problem lies at the very heart of the philoso-
phy of limited government and individual rights, as expressed in the
Constitution."0 Indeed, the fundamental theory of American govern-
ment is founded upon the concepts of reserved rights and delegated
powers.2" The ninth amendment of the Constitution refers to reserved
rights, and the tenth amendment'refers to delegated powers.
The fact that both these provisions were included in the Constitu-
tion and the fact that they were placed side by side in the Bill of Rights
makes it evident that there was some distinction in the minds of the
framers between declaration of right and limitations on power.2 If this
had not been the case, the limitations of power and reservations of rights
contained in the body of the Constitution, taken along with the tenth
on federal employees' political activities against ninth amendment claims); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity is not protected through ninth amend-
ment rights).
18. Since the Griswold decision, there has been a good deal of scholarly activity
regarding ninth amendment theories and issues. See Franklin, The Ninth Amendment,
40 TUL L. REV. 172 (1966); Kitner, Neglected Ninth Amendment: The Other Rights
Retained by the People, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 121 (1967); Comment, Ninth Amendment
Vindication of Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 42 TEMP. L.Q. 46 (1968); Moore,
Ninth Amendment - Its Origins and Meaning, 7 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 215 (1972);
Rhoades, Ninth Amendment: A Survey of Theory and Practice in the Federal Courts
Since Griswold v. Connecticut, 50 DENVER L.J. 153 (1973); Towe, Natural Law and
the Ninth Amendment, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 270 (1975).
19. Kelley, supra note 14, at 834.
20. Kelsey, supra note 11, at 309.
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amendment reservation of power to the states and to the people would
have sufficed, and the ninth amendment would have been unneces-
sary.
Thus, the ninth amendment cannot simply be ignored. It has been
held that, when interpreting the Constitution, no section, sentence or
even word is unnecessary.2 No word was included needlessly, and subse-
quently nothing in the Constitution can be held to be superfluous.2
It is inconsistent with such a holding that the ninth amendment
could be viewed as a mere rule of construction, a guidepost pointing to
other sections of the Constitution, as Mr. Justice Goldberg maintained
in Griswold v. Connecticut."8 Rather, "[i]t must be a positive declara-
tion of existing through unnamed rights, which may be vindicated under
the authority of the amendment whenever and if ever any govern-
mental authority shall aspire to ungranted power in contravention of
'unenumerated rights.' "2
The theory that the ninth amendment is indeed a positive declara-
tion of rights is not a new one. Mr. Justice Story said of the ninth
amendment:
This clause was manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse or ingen-
ious misapplication of the well known maxim, that an affirmation in
particular cases implies a negation in all others ...a conclusive answer
is, that such an attempt may be interdicted (as it has been) by a positive
declaration in such a bill of rights, that the enumeration of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple.29
C. Finding the Unenumerated Rights
The rights enumerated in the Constitution 31 constitute an impos-
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 323.
26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
27. Kelsey, supra note 11, at 323.
28. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Vol.
11, 623-27 (1833).
29. Id. at 626, §1867.
30. The enumerated rights include: freedom of speech, religion, the press, assem-
blage, petition (amend 1); to keep and bear arms (amend. II) on quartering troops
(amend. Ill); from search and seizure (amend. IV); of presentment and indictment,
against double jeopardy, against self-incrimination, against deprivation of life, liberty
6
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ing catalogue of human rights." The positive declaration theory of
interpreting the ninth amendment asserts that rights enumerated in the
Constitution by means of guarantee, limitation or prohibition do not
preclude the existence of other rights retained by the people. With this
rule of construction in mind, it is necessary to operate under the assu.mp-
tion that, in the minds of the framers, other non-enumerated rights did
exist. The next question is how to determine what these rights are.
(1) INTENT OF THE FRAMERS
One method of determining the unenumerated rights protected by
the ninth amendment is to consult the several documentations of the
basic human values and liberties that were most likely among those
cherished by the framers of the Constitution.32 Perhaps these rights
were best expressed and most familiar to the framers and colonists alike
in Blackstone's Commentaries, nearly as many copies of which were
sold in the colonies as in England.3 Blackstone classified the natural
rights of human beings under three categories: (I) Personal Security,
(II) Personal Liberty and (III) Private Property.34 To these, Black-
stone's American counterpart Chancellor Kent added the American
contribution of (IV) Religious Freedom.35
Two rights cherished by the framers are crucial in formulating
regulatory policy. One of the rights most important to the framers was
the right of the people to have a government which functions in the
public interest and for the common good.3s Statements to this effect
or property, against taking of property, (amend. V); for fair and speedy criminal trials
(amend. VI); for jury trials in civil suits at common law (amend. VII); against excessive
bail, against cruel and unusual punishments (amend. VIII); against abridgement of
privileges and immunities, deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, for equal protection of the law (amend. XIV); against denial of suffrage (amends.
XV, XIX, XXIV and XXVI); limitations on taxation (art. I, sec. 8, cl. I and art. I,
sec. 9, cl. 4 and 5); limitations on suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (art. I, sec. 9,
cl. 2); freedom from bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, laws impairing the obligation
of contract (art. I, sec. 10, cl. 1); limitations on conviction of treason (art. III, sec. 3);
prohibitions on corruption of blood or forfeiture (art. III, sec. 3, cl. 2); the guarantee
of a republican form of government (art. IV, sec. 4).
31. Kelsey, supra note 11, at 312.
32. Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment - A New Form of
Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 231 (1975).
33. Kelsey, supra note 11, at 313.
34. W. BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 129-45 (1884).
35. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1858).
36. Call, Federalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 DICKINSON L.REv. 122
7
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were included in the constitutions of the various colonies.3 7
In addition, the framers believed that each citizen had an equal
political interest in all questions of public policy and that each had equal
political rights, including access to the governmental process and the
right to have a voice in its decision. This right has been expressed as
the right of "access to a free and full shaping and sharing of power," 3
and Thomas Paine regarded it as one of the foremost redeeming quali-
ties of a representative democracy.39 It follows that effective denial of
the individual's right to political participation in governmental decision-
making, resulting from deference to the minority views of special inter-
est groups, is in itself a denial or disparagement by decisional bodies of
the citizens' right to full participation in government-an "undue" pro-
cess of law and government."
(2) JUDICIAL DETERMINATION
The second and perhaps best method of determining which enumer-
ated rights are protected by the ninth amendment is the gradual process
of judicial determination by inclusion and exclusion.4 Apart from
Griswold, no case has decided the scope of the ninth amendment, even
in part.42 Furthermore, no opinions have cited the ninth amendment as
the basis for the assertion or vindication of a right.4"
However, certain rights have been confirmed or rejected on the
basis of whether or not they are "natural rights." For example, the right
to attend state educational institutions" and to serve as a juror 5 have
(1959). See also Declaration of Independence (1776); U.S. CONST. preamble.
37. E.g., The Constitution of Pennsylvania, as adopted on September 28, 1776
states: "All powers are inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on
their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness. The community
hath an indisputable, inalienable and indefensible right to reform, alter, or abolish
governments, in such a manner as shall be, by that community, judged most productive
to the common total. All officers of the government are their trustees and servants,
and at all times accountable to them."
38. Paust, supra note 32, at 261.
39. See T. PAINE, 2 THE RIGHTS OF MAN 26 (1794).
40. Paust, supra note 32, at 261.
41. 16 AM. JUR.2D, Constitutional Law, §331 (1964). See also In re Morgan, 58
P. 1070 (Wash. 1899); Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63 (1867).
42. See note 17 supra.
43. Kelsey, supra note 11, at 319.
44. Board of Trustees of University of Mississippi v. Waugh, 62 So. 827 (Miss.
1913), affd, 237 U.S. 589 (1915).
45. People ex. rel. Murray v. Holmes, 341 Ill. 23, 173 N.E. 145 (1930).
8
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been found not to be natural rights, but rather gifts of our civilization
and the legislature. Rights judged to be natural and inherent include the
right of a natural affection between parents and offspring,48 the right to
travel from state to state," and the right to certain governmental serv-
ices."'
Two such natural rights are directly affected by government regula-
tion of biotechnology. In dictum in Griswold v. Connecticut,49 the Su-
preme Court suggested that the right of "freedom of inquiry" is a
fundamental right within the penumbra of rights entitled to constitu-
tional protection. This freedom, which scientists have struggled to
achieve since the time of Galileo, 5 has been an important factor in the
formulation of scientific policy. 51
Another right which the courts have determined to be natural and
constitutional is the right to beget children. 52 Although this right was
upheld over fifty years ago in a lower court, the right has never been
subsequently denied. If judicial determination was indeed to be em-
ployed as a means of designating protected ninth amendment rights,
perhaps the United States Supreme Court should be viewed as the only
court qualified to make such determinations. It must also be considered
that predictions of an imminent population explosion might outweigh
this right. Nonetheless, the right to beget children has at least been
suggested to be a natural right protected by the ninth amendment.
Accordingly, regulations burdening decisions to beget children may be
justified only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn
to express only those interests.53
46. Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613 (1922).
47. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall 35 (1868).
48. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See also notes 77
through 85 and accompanying text infra.
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. Lederberg, The Freedoms and the Control of Science: Notes from the Ivory
Tower, 45 S.CAL. L. REv. 596-97 (1972).
51. 41 Fed. Reg. 27, 903 (1976). A central concern of the National Institutes of
Health [NIH] was apparently whether or not the guidelines for recombinant DNA
research "balanced scientific responsibility to the public with scientific freedom to
pursue new knowledge."
52. Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925).
53. Carey v. Population Services Intern., - U.S. , 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977)
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2. THE REACH OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Although widespread government regulation is an accepted reality,
the constitutional basis for and limitations on the power of the govern-
ment to regulate must be considered. The commerce clause is the
primary constitutional basis for regulation by the federal government
in the areas of the environment and public health.5 Congress could
enact some regulations regarding the interstate shipment of materials
pertaining to genetic activity, such as recombinant DNA materials,
under the commerce clause. The ultimate question is to what extent
Congress can enact such regulations when they are held to conflict with
constitutional rights of the people, especially when the activities in ques-
tion are intrastate or privately sponsored.
A. The "Affecting Commerce" Standard
The interpretation of the commerce clause as originally articulated
by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden57 defined Congress'
power as extending to "that commerce which concerns more states than
one." 8 Supreme Court decisions of the late 1930's and early 1940's
established that Congress had power under the commerce clause to
regulate nearly all aspects of the interrelated American economy. 9 The
courts have indicated that an activity "affects" interstate commerce, so
as to be subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause,6" as
54. The commerce clause states: "The Congress shall have power. . . to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the Several States. . ." Art. I, sec. 8, cl.
3. See also Note, Recombinant DNA and Technology Assessment, 11 GEORGIA L.REV.
832 (1977).
55. See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §2601 (Supp. Dec. 1976);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §1857 (1970); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§1251 (Supp. I 1972).
56. 41 Fed. Reg. 27, 914 (1976).
57. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 194 (1829).
58. Id.; see also Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One,
47 HARV. L.REV. 1335 (1934).
59. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited - The Federalization of Intrastate
Crime, 15 ARIz. L.REv. 271 (1973). For the story of how the Supreme Court arrived
at this conclusion, see BENSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE,
1937-1970 (1970); TRIBE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT - SEPARATION AND DIVISION OF POWERS (1978); Stem, The Commerce Clause
and the National Economy 1933-46, 59"HARV. L. REV. 645, 883 (1946).
60. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
3:979 1
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long as interstate commerce is a "practical" consequence of the activ-
ity.61
The "affecting commerce" rationale was construed so broadly as
to subject seemingly all local activities to federal regulation. InWickard
v. Filburn2 the Supreme Court upheld Federal regulations of the .pro-
duction of wheat grown solely for home consumption on the grounds
that such activity in the aggregate could affect the interstate market by
depressing the farmer's demand for wheat or by ultimately being mar-
keted itself.63
The Court went even further in Perez v. United States,64 where it
upheld the application of a statute to a particular intrastate crime with-
out requiring the government to demonstrate any interstate nexus. In
this apparent extention of the Wickard principle, Mr. Justice Douglas
stated, "[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is
within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to excise
as trivial, individual instances of the class.""
B. Regulations to Further Non-Economic Purposes
In recent cases, it has been shown that Congress may regulate
interstate commerce, for a variety of reasons, as long as the conditions
themselves violate no other constitutional prohibition or grant of
rights.66 One permissible and especially potent form of federal regula-
tion of commerce is the congressional imposition of "protective condi-
tions" on the privilege of engaging in commerce. The intent of such
regulations has been to combat activities disfavored by Congress for
primarily non-commercial reasons. The Court has upheld the constitu-
tionality of such legislation since it ruled that legislation banning the
interstate transportation of lottery tickets was constitutional in the fa-
mous "Lottery Case" of Champion v. Ames."7
61. 301 U.S. at 41-42.
62. 317 U.S. It1 (1942).
63. Id. at 127-29
64. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
65. Id. at 152, 154.
66. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 238.
67. 188 U.S. 321 (1903). In the single case of Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251 (1903) the Supreme Court reversed itself in holding that Congress could not prohibit
interstate commerce in the products of child labor, since it involved regulating produc-
tion by standardizing the ages at which children could be lawfully employed, rather than
regulating interstate transportation. Apart from this isolated instance, the Supreme
11
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The significant challenges in recent years to the exercise of the
federal commerce power have dealt with its application for non-
economic purposes. The public accommodation act of the Civil Rights
Act of 19648 prohibited racial discrimination by hotels, restaurants or
other establishments receiving transients or interstate travelers. 9 Ob-
viously, this Act was directed at practices especially prevalent in the
Southern states, which substantially handicapped and inhibited the in-
terstate movement of many persons, primarily blacks.70
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,7' the Supreme
Court upheld Congress' power, exercised in Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, to prohibit racial discrimination in places of public accom-
modation on the grounds that Congress had a rational basis for finding
that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and that Con-
gress had selected a reasonable and appropriate means to eliminate this
evil. 72 Similarly, in Katzenbach v. McClung,73 the Court upheld the
Civil Rights Act's extension of the prohibition to all restaurants serving
food which had moved in interstate commerce, since the restaurant, due
to its failure to serve blacks, was either subject to federal regulation of
all of its practices, or would reduce the amount of food moving in
commerce.
74
In these cases the Court reaffirmed current commerce clause doc-
trines. First, the slightest interstate connection can provide an adequate
Court has upheld such congressional regulations to impose "Protective conditions" on
the activities of interstate commerce. See Hypolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S.
45 (1911); Hale v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Brooks v. United States, 267
U.S. 432 (1925) and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Here the Court stated
its philosophy regarding cases of this nature: "Congress . . . is free to exclude from
[such] commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined it may
conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals, or welfare. . . ." According to
Charles Black, the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could
have been more straight-forwardly justified along the lines of this "protective principle"
in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). See BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, 55-57 (1969).
68. 42 U.S.C. §2000(a) et seq (1970).
69. Id. at §§ 2000(a), (b)(1), (c).
70. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. at 254-58.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
74. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited - The Federalization of Intrastate
Crime, supra note 59, at 272.
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basis even for federal commerce regulations which serve a non-
economic purpose. 5 Second, Congress has the power to regulate acts
which in isolation have no significant effect on interstate commerce but
are part of a class which as a whole could be said to have such an effect.76
C. A Less Expansive Interpretation
For the first time since Wickard, the Supreme Court has retreated
from its expansive interpretation of Congress' power under the
commerce clause in a case which is one of the Court's major federalism
decisions of the post-1937 era.77 In the 1976 case of National League of
Cities v. Usery,18 the Court invalidated the 1974 amendments to the Fair
Labor Standards Act which had extended federal maximum hour and
minimum wage provisions to all state and municipal employees," thus
holding a congressional regulation of commerce to be an unconstitu-
tional intrusion upon the sovereignty of state and local governments for
the first time in forty years."0
While the Court's decision in National League of Cities that Con-
gress had violated state sovereignty came as a surprise to some, the
Court had recently handed down numerous decisions protecting rights
of states in the federal system." Yet, this very familiarity of the federal-
ism theme poses the danger that the decision will be read as a general
75. Id.
76. 379 U.S. at 300-301.
77. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 236.
78. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
79. . Pub. L. No. 93-259, §§6(a)(1), (5), (6); 88 Stat. 58 (1974), codified at 29
U.S.C. §§203(d), (s), (x).
80. The latest such holding was Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
81. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (absent bad faith or extraor-
dinary circumstances, federal court is precluded from enjoining pending state criminal
prosecution by considerations of equity, comity, and federalism); O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1974) (holding there is no equitable relief against state criminal magis-
trate and judge for alleged practice of discriminatory bond setting and sentencing);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (eleventh amendment prevents liability for
damages payable from state treasury); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (hold-
ing that Congress may not exercise power in a way that impairs the states' integrity or
their ability to function effectively in a federal system); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976) (federal court may not order structural changes in police departments which have
invaded constitutional rights unless high-level official encouragement of such miscon-
duct is shown); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (restricting range of property and
liberty interests protected by the fourteenth amendment).
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vindication of the autonomy of states and municipalities to the detri-
ment of individual rights." If the case is regarded as such, problematic
distinctions arise in the majority opinion of Justice Rehnquist. For ex-
ample, it seems that the Court is anomalously asserting that Congress
retains the power to strike down state regulation of private conduct, but
does not possess the same power to control the regulation of state
employees u Furthermore, this decision and others84 make a proble-
matic distinction between federal legislation regulating commerce, and
similar legislation enforcing rights under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. 5
(1) THE THEORY
Professor Tribe has suggested an alternative interpretation of
National League of Cities which resolves the conflicting priorities of the
decision without doing violence to the Court's established notions both
of federalism and of the judicial accommodation of conflicting values.86
He sees the decision as one based on the protection of individual rights,
in this instance, the right to basic government services. 7 Basically, the
argument is that policy-based congressional legislation which threatens
the provision of vital services is unlike similar legislation directed at
private parties in that it presents the consitutional problem of endanger-
ing efforts by state and local governments to meet their citizens' legiti-
82. For an analysis of the decision as imposing limitation on the congressional
power under the commerce clause by asserting the rights of the states under the tenth
amendment, see Comment, Constitutional Implications of a Federal Collective Bargain-
ing Law for State and Local Government Employees, 1I CREIGHTON L. REV. 863
(1978).
83. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 312.
84. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (application to state employees
of a federal antidiscrimination statute sustained as an exercise of Congress' power under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendmenti.
85. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 313.
86. Id. at 314. See also Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1065 (1977).
87. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 313. Tribe's theory has not achieved widespread
support, a fact which he anticipated: "That the account suggested here is unconven-
tional seems clear enough . . . others will surely seek to defend National League of
Cities in terms that focus on state autonomy as such, paying only secondary attention
to the underlying concern for adequate provision of essential services . . . Doubting
. . . such an explanation, I have relied upon my own quite speculative thesis."
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mate expectations of basic government services. The language of Justice
Rehnquist could well be read to assert such a theory:
Even if we accept [the Federal Government's] assessments concerning
the impact of the [wage and hour regulations], their application will none-
theless significantly alter or displace the states' abilities to structure
employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police
protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation. These
activities are typical of those performed by state and local governments
• . . Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments are created
to provide, such services as these which the states have traditionally
afforded their citizens. s
If such individual rights against the government for basic services
do exist, there must be a means to enforce these rights. National League
of Cities could be seen as the precedent for enforcing individual rights
against the government for certain basic services in areas where the
federal government has left to the states and localities the responsibility
of providing these services."9
(2) RAMIFICATIONS OF THE THEORY
The recognition of rights of individuals to basic governmental serv-
ices is a two-edged sword. In instances where, due to the national char-
acter or other aspects of the problem, congressional action results in a
lesser degree of restriction on individual rights than state action, the
congressional action would prevail.9" Thus, this decision does not pro-
pose a wholesale reallocation of powers in our federal system in favor
of state and local government. As long as congressional legislation re-
flects a compelling government interest and does not jeopardize individ-
ual rights, the courts should not be expected to object. The crucial point
is that, barring overriding governmental concerns," the courts must
88. 426 U.S. at 851. For an analysis dealing with this aspect of the case, see
Michelman, States Rights and States' Roles: The Permutations of 'Sovereignty' in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977).
89. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 315.
90. Id. at 316-17.
91. In National League of Cities, Justice Rehnquist distinguished Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), where the Court upheld the application of the national
wage freeze to state and local employees. He noted the emergency character of the
legislation and the national scope of the problem. Furthermore, the federal action re-
sulted in reducing rather than increasing the burden upon state budgets, thus enhancing
the ability of the state and local governments to provide basic governmental services.
13:1979
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insure a "necessarily over inclusive protection of individual rights. 19 2
In summary, the Court's decision in National League of Cities
asserts two principles of particular relevance to determining the consti-
tutionality of government regulation. The Court did not question the
fact that the amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act were
"undoubtedly within the scope of the commerce clause,"93 but rather
objected to the legislation on the ground that it deprived the states of
the sovereignty necessary to insure individual rights to basic governmen-
tal services. Thus, the first principle is that, if federal government regu-
lation imposed via the commerce clause unduly risks infringement of
affirmative individual rights, Congress must justify actions which would
otherwise clearly be within its powers. 4 Second, the courts are obliged
to insure a necessarily overinclusive protection of individual rights and,
when conflicts arise, defer to either the federal or state and local actions
by determining which of the two infringes least on the exercise of legiti-
mate individual rights.95
3. THE MODEL AND ITS RATIONALE
The following pages will discuss whether and the extent to which
research and application of the technologies of in vitro fertilization,
recombinant DNA, and cloning should be regulated by the government.
In the past, it has been widely assumed that the government had the
power and even the duty to regulate such areas. The power was seen as
arising from the Court's interpretation of the commerce clause as allow-
ing Congress to legislate to further its non-economic purposes via the
imposition of protective conditions on the privilege of engaging in any
activity seen to affect commerce. Furthermore, the promulgation of
regulations to protect the public health has traditionally been seen as a
foremost duty of both state and federal governments.
However, the Court's recent construction of the commerce clause
in National League of Cities, viewed in conjunction with the positive
declaration of unenumerated rights theory of the ninth amendment,
provides grounds for the formulation of a new approach to government
regulation in these areas. I have combined these two themes to derive
the following model, which serves as the guidepost to the central theme
92. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 316-17.
93. 426 U.S. at 841.
94. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 316.
95. Id.
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of the later secions of this article: Although the government might
technically have the power to regulate in a given area under the com-
merce clause, if such regulation threatens to infringe upon enumerated
rights, or unenumerated rights protected by the ninth amendment, the
government must insure a necessarily overinclusive protection of these
rights, and must prove that there is a compelling need for the regulation
which justifies the infringement of these rights.
To determine whether the present extent of regulation imposed on
the research and application of in vitro fertilization, recombinant DNA,
and cloning is appropriate and, if not, to suggest an alternative, both
the compelling need for government regulation under the commerce
clause, and the individual ninth amendment rights which such regulation
would threaten, will be assessed in each respective field.
Four basic regulatory options with respect to the use of these tech-
nologies will be considered: 8
(1) No regulation/Marketplace - Decisions made by individuals.
Physicians inform persons what can or should be done in a particular
case, and individuals make their decisions based on this information.
(2) Decisions Made by the Medical Community - Such as medical
associations or quasi-public bodies like the National Institutes of Health.
While such pronouncements are not legally binding, they have great
moral force and can effectively resolve issues which would otherwise be
settled in court or by formal regulation.
(3) Judge-Made Law - Legal standards relating to the use of ge-
netic technology will eventually emerge as people seek legal remedy for
the consequences of such activities. The first such cases will be decided
by reference to precedents involving general medical procedures and
other relevant precedents. Eventually, however, a body of judge-made
laws pertaining specifically to genetic technology will evolve.
(4) Direct Legislation - Made either by legislative bodies or by
regulatory agencies to which the legislature delegates the authority to
regulate.
There are three assumptions implicit in the following analysis. The
first is that the unenumerated rights mentioned in Part 1 as being im-
plicit in and protected by the ninth amendment merit the same protec-
96. The following four options are taken from Green, Law and Policy for the
Brave New World, 48 INDIANA L. J. 559, 572-74 (1973) and TRIBE, CHANNELLING
TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW 52-60 (1973). Professor Tribe theorized that technologies
which meet with public approval will be encouraged by increased public consumption,
while those rejected will be limited or eliminated by lack of demand.
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tion as rights expressly enumerated in the Constitution. The unenumer-
ated rights considered in this article are: (1) The right of the people to
have a government which functions in the public interest and for the
common good; (2) The right to full participation in government and
access to a free and full shaping and sharing of power through participa-
tion in the governmental decision-making process, unencumbered by
undue deference to minority views or special interest groups; (3) The
right to freedom of inquiry; and (4) the right to beget children.
Second, Professor Tribe's interpretation of the commerce clause as
seen through the National League of Cities decision is regarded as the
status quo. In other words, if federal regulations imposed via the com-
merce clause infringe upon the rights of individuals, the regulations can
be justified only by demonstrating a compelling need for the regulations.
The third and perhaps most crucial premise from which the follow-
ing conclusions are drawn is that governs best which governs least.
Government is created to serve the people, rather than for the people
to serve government. Regulations are not an end in themselves, and
should be imposed only when necessary to protect the exercise of vital
individual rights. Thus, regulations should never impose more restric-
tions on the exercise of rights than would be the case in their absence.
4. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
With the birth of Louise Brown on July 25, 1978,11 the prospect of
successful in vitro fertilization has become a reality. The process in-
volved in vitro fertilization is conceptually straightforward. 8 Ripe eggs
are removed from the female's ovary through an incision in the abdom-
inal wall and placed in a glass "petri" dish containing blood serum and
nutrients. Sperm cells from the male, which have been prepared for
fertilization, are added to the petri dish and, within a few hours, fertili-
zation occurs. The fertilized egg divides for between two and six days
until it is approximately a 100-celled embryo called a blastocyst. The
blastocyst then is placed in the women's uterus where, if all goes well,
97. Test-Tube Baby: It's a Girl, TIME, August 7, 1978 at 68. Since the Brown
baby, there have been other reported test-tube births. See, e.g., "Test-Tube Baby" Born
in India, Facts on File, October 27, 1978 at 824.
98. For detailed descriptions comprehensible to the lay person, see In Vitro Fertil-
ization: Is it Safe and Repeatable? 201 SCIENCE 698 (1978); The First Test-Tube Baby,
TIME, July 31, 1978 at 58. See also Kass, Babies by Means of In Vitro Fertilization:
Unethical Experiments on the Unborn? 285 N.E.J. MED. 1174 (1971).
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it attaches to the uterus wall and normal embryo development and birth
result."
The potential benefits of this technique, if perfected, are significant,
since it provides a means whereby women who are infertile due to
fallopian tube disorders can have children.""0 In addition, Dr. Carl
Pauerstein of the University of Texas states that in vitro research "has
the potential for adding greatly to the knowledge of the reproductive
biology of our species." 10'
A. Existing Government Regulation
The government has felt that the risks involved in the process out-
weigh its advantages, and has imposed an unofficial federal moratorium
which has halted all United States research involving in vitro fertiliza-
tion in humans as of 1975.102 In a 1975 federal order, the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare was barred from funding any in vitro
fertilization"0 experiments unless they were first approved by the Na-
tional Ethics Advisory Board appointed by the Secretary of HEW.,0 4
Perhaps due to its controversial nature, this panel was not formed
until January of 1978, and did not meet to begin deciding whether or
not to recommend that the moratorium be lifted until the following
September. Strong opposition to federal financing of in vitro research
has surfaced at regional hearings of the Board, although a final determi-
nation has not yet been made. 05 In the face of such delays, scientists
such as Joseph D.- Schulman of the National Institute of Child Health
and Human Development lament that, "for every year that we wait,
99. This scenario is taken from the sources supra note 98. Since the birth of
Louise Brown, Dr. Patrick Steptoe claims to have improved the technique of test tube
fertilization and implantation. See Gain Claimed in Test Tube Baby Method, The New
York Times, Dec. 2, 1978, section C at 6.
100. Green, Law and Policy for the Brave New World, 48 INDIANA L. J. at 562
(1973).
101. The First Test-Tube Baby, supra note 98, at 59.
102. Id. at 62.
103. Private foundations have also hesitated to fund such experiments in the
United States. Ironically, America's own Ford Foundation pays the salary through
endowment of Robert Edwards, the physiologist responsible for the birth of Louise
Brown. See In Vitro Fertilization: Is it Safe and Repeatable? supra note 98, at 699.
104. The First Test-Tube Baby, supra note 98, at 62.
105. In Vitro Fertilization: Is it Safe and Repeatable? supra note 98, at 699. For
a report of testimony at one such regional hearing, see Testimony Opposes Test-Tube
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thousands of infertile American women will, because of their ages, lose
forever their opportunity to have children."' 6
B. The Compelling Need for Government Regulation
Under the Commerce Clause
The government and others opposed to in vitro research see basi-
cally three potential dangers. First, there is the medical danger that the
process would result in abnormal babies.07 As Dr. John Marshall, head
of obstetrics and gynecology at Los Angeles County's Harber General
Hospital puts it, "the potential for misadventure is unlimited . . . What
if we got an otherwise perfectly formed individual that was a cyclops?"' 18
The vast preponderance of research and expert opinions suggest
that these fears of biological disaster are totally unfounded. According
to Schulman, "there are no data to support the hypothetical fears that
in vitro fertilization will lead to abnormal babies." ' 9 Schulman points
out that, in the course of the substantial amount of work that has been
done with animals ranging from mice to sheep, pigs, horses and cows,
there has been no confirmed evidence that in vitro fertilization leads to
genetic or morphological abnormalities in the offspring of any species.
Furthermore, these pre-implantation embryos are remarkably re-
sistant to manipulation, and may even be fused or frozen and still result
in normal offspring." 0 Perhaps the ultimate evidence of the process'
safety was the birth of normal, healthy Louise Brown, the first "test-
tube" baby.
Schulman also contends that, even if there is a risk of abnormality,
the decision to have a child should be left to the prospective parents, as
is the customary procedure in the medical profession when similar risks
are involved."' For example, if one or both parents are thought to carry
traits of various genetic diseases, such as hemophilia or sickle cell ane-
mia, the couple is not told that they cannot have children. Rather, they
are often encouraged to undergo genetic counseling and to assess the
106. Id. For federal legislation regarding this technology, see National Research
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348 (1974); Part 46 of 45 C.F.R. subtitle A and amendments in
43, No. 7 Fed. Reg. 1759 (1978).
107. In Vitro Fertilization: Is It Safe and Repeatable? supra note 98, at 699.
108. The First Test-Tube Baby, supra note 98, at 59.
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condition of the developing fetus through amniocentesis." 2 The ultimate
decision is left to the parents. There is no reason why a similar proce-
dure could and should not be used in cases of in vitro fertilization and
embryo transplantation.
The second perceived need for government regulation stems from
anticipated ethical problems feared to result from in vitro fertilization.
In the words of Nobel Laureate James Watson, there is the potential
for "all sorts of bad scenarios. 113 Foremost is the question of the
morality of this experiment, even with the informed consent of the
parties involved, and the specter at the end of the road of maintaining
a fetus in vitro to the point of birth.11 4 There is the possibliity of surro-
gate motherhood, or "wombs for rent" in which a woman's egg would
be fertilized and implanted in another woman for biological reasons, for
the sake of convenience, or perhaps even without the consent or knowl-
edge of the donors.1 Some fear that so-called "baby factories" could
result in which people would be bred for specific desirable traits. Finally,
if an embryo developing in vitro were to be terminated at the will of the
donors, doctors or both, would this be regarded as murder if done
beyond a certain stage of embryonic development?
Fears that such dangers would result from the application of in
vitro technology, while commonly held, are largely unfounded. Use of
the technology could be restricted to cases in which the donors are a
married couple and the fetus is implanted in the uterus of the biological
mother. Such situations would not be essentially different from ordinary
biological parenthood."' If in vitro fertilization and embryo transplan-
tation involved using the sperm of a donor, the case would be similar
to artificial insemination"7 which has been used successfully and without
significant controversy for a number of years.'
The chance that widespread human "breeding" would occur seems
112. The surgical procedure of inserting a hollow needle through the abdominal
wall into the uterus of a pregnant woman and extracting amniotic fluid for analysis to
determine the presence of disease, genetic defects, etc.
113. The First Test-Tube Baby, supra note 98, at 562-63.
114. Green, supra note 100, at 562-63.
115. Id.
116. Hudock, Frankenstein is Still a Myth, But it Should be Read Periodically,
48 INDIANA L. J. 553 (1973).
117. The impregnation of a female by artificial introduction of semen taken from
a male.
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unlikely in view of the fact that, in the past, this has not been attempted
by either artificial insemination or natural conception, except perhaps
in isolated cases. Standards regarding the "killing" of embryos develop-
ing in vitro could be the same as those set for abortions.
Lest the possibility be overlooked, it should be mentioned that
maintaining a fetus in vitro to the point of birth could prove to be highly
beneficial, in terms of both convenience for the mother,"' and the provi-
sion of a controlled and risk-free artificial womb for the fetus.
The third feared danger of in vitro technology is that unmanageable
legal complications would result. In the eyes of the law, would the child
belong to the donor of the egg, or the surrogate who bears the child?,"0
Who would be responsible for providing monetary support? In the case
of death or deformity of the fetus, should responsibility lie with the
biological parents, the surrogate mother, the doctor or perhaps even the
government?2 1
The resolution of such legal questions should not be as difficult as
it might first appear. In vitro fertilization and embryo transplantation
would be performed only by qualified and licensed persons. Rights,
responsibilities, and the potential liabilities of all involved could be
contractually pre-determined before any action was taken. 22 Thus, any
legal controversy which arose could be resolved by customary means in
the courts of law.
In conclusion, the case foreshowing a compelling need for govern-
ment regulation of in vitro fertilization is negligible at best in terms of
biological dangers, ethical controversies, and legal entanglements.
C. Threatened Ninth Amendment Rights
The constitutional rights of individuals which would potentially be
infringed if in vitro fertilization was subjected to government regula-
tion 23 are several. There is the right to freedom of scientific inquiry and
research. Also affected is the right to beget children. The exercise of this
right justifies the use of any means which does not subsequently infringe
the rights of any other party. Such means might include the taking of
fertility drugs, the use of artificial insemination, or application of the
technology of in vitro fertilization.
Related is the right of the people to have a government which
functions in the public interest and for the common good. It is in the
119. Hudock, supra note 116, at 555.
120. Green, supra note 100, at 562.
121. The First Test Tube Baby, supra note 98, at 59.
122. Hudock, supra note 116, at 553-55.
123. As has been the practical case since 1975.
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common interest to have a government which does not infringe upon
constitutional rights of individuals when compelling dangers are not at
stake. Since the right to have children is a constitutional right, it is in
the public interest to allow for the exercise of this right by artificial
insemination, if necessary.
Finally, there is the right to full participation in and access to a free
and full sharing of power and shaping of public policy unencumbered
by undue deference to minority views of special interest groups. The
option which would allow for the greatest public participation in in vitro
decisions would be to impose no regulations, and allow decisions regard-
ing this technology to be made in the marketplace or on an individual
patient-doctor basis.
D. Policy Assessment
Available evidence suggests that application of in vitro technology
poses no danger that would justify the need for government regulations.
Scientists should be free to do research in the area, and persons should
be free to decide whether, when and to what extent they wish to use these
technologies on an individual basis. Any legal controversies arising out
of such actions could be settled in the courts.
5. RECOMBINANT DNA
The distinctive traits which characterize each species on earth are
determined by inheritance factors known as genes.124 These genes have
been identified as strings of matter called chromosomes, which consist
of segments of deoxyribose nucleic acid [DNA]'2 and are found in the
nucleus of every living cell. It is the myriad of potential sets of molecular
combinations of DNA which is responsible for the particular gene pools
which define each species. The species maintain their identities because
they are unable to mix their gene pools with those of any other species
through reproduction.1 28
124. Note, Recombinant DNA and Technology Assessment, 11 GEORGIA L.REv.
at 791 (1977).
125. Although Mendel first hypothesized the existence of genes in the nineteenth
century, their location was not identified for another fifty years until the work of Watson
and Crick. See Watson and Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A Structure
for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737 (1953). See also WATSON, THE DOUBLE
HELIX (1963).
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Molecular biologists have recently acquired the remarkable ability
to break through these natural barriers by developing techniques to
"recombine" or"splice" DNA segments from one species into.the DNA
chain of another species, where the combined segments will replicate as
a part of the normal metabolism of the host cell.121 This technique of
"gene splicing" or recombinant DNA'2 was developed in 1972 and, for
the first time, allowed researchers to manipulate DNA within cells of
lower organisms.' The technique involves utilizing an enzyme 3 1 to cut
a segment of DNA from the chromosome of one organism and place it
in the chromosome of another organism, thus constructing a molecule
containing portions of DNA from two organisms. When placed inside
a host cell, the cell replicates normally, each subsequent cell containing
identical sets of the newly constructed DNA strands . 31
This process was first used to recombine DNA segments from the
same bacterial species, E. coli. 32 Subsequently, biologists have success-
fully combined segments from two unrelated species of bacteria, and
DNA from a toad into E. coli. 33 All recombined molecules have
demonstrated normal replication and metabolism, in addition to show-
ing the appropriate cellular effect of the spliced gene. Theoretically, it
is now possible to isolate a DNA segment from any species of plant or
animal and recombine it~into a new host cell, which would then exhibit
certain specific characteristics of the foreign species. 34
The development of recombinant DNA technology represents a
major breakthrough in the field of the biological sciences . 3 An obvious
127. For a detailed description of this technique, see Cohen, The Manipulation
of Genes, 233 Sci. AMER. 24 (1975).
128. For scientific discussion of recombinant DNA research intelligible to the lay
person see, e.g., Grobstein, The Recombinant DNA Debate, 237 SCIENTIFIC AM. 22
(1976); Recombinant DNA: Impacts and Advances, 109 SCIENCE NEWS 389 (1976);
Miller, Recombinant DNA Research, 111 Sci. NEws 216 (1977); Schneider, Genetic
Engineering: Threat and Promise, TECH. REv. (1976).
129. Comment, Law v. Science: Legal Control of Genetic Research, 65
KENTUCKY L.J. 880 (1977).
130. A type of protein that promotes the chemical processes of life without itself
being altered or destroyed.
131. Comment, supra note 129, at 881.
132. Cohen, supra note 127, at 31. E. coli. stands for Escherichia coli. Strain K-
12 is the most commonly used.
133. Id.
134. Note, supra note 124, at 792.
135. See Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, Draft Environmental Impact
Statement, 41 Fed. Reg. 38, 426, 431-32 (1976).
1 88 3:979 1
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advantage of this work is the advancement of scientific knowledge,'
specifically of the biological processes. The technique could be used for
the cheap and efficient production of medically important substances
such as insulin, for which a world-wide shortage appears imminent.',
Certain genetic diseases such a sickle-cell anemia might be cured simply
by replacing the responsible gene.'38 Pollutants could be neutralized by
manufactured microbes."9 The number of potentially beneficial appli-
cations of this technology is indeed staggering.
A. Existing Government Regulation
There are presently various existing and proposed regulations re-
garding research on and application of recombinant DNA technology.
Shortly after the recombinant DNA technique was developed, scientists
became concerned with the potential for danger and a worldwide mora-
torium was called until hazards could be evaluated and standards devel-
oped." Eight months later, the first attempt at regulating the research
came from the scientists themselves at the international Asilomar Con-
ference which was held in California in 1975.111 The prominent research-
ers participating in the Conference agreed that subsequent recombinant
DNA research should proceed under a set of guidelines adopted by the
Conference.' The adopted guidelines lifted the worldwide moratorium
and imposed a voluntary ban on research judged to be too dangerous
under any circumstances.' 3 All other experiments were allowed to pro-
ceed, provided that set safety conditions were maintained to insure that
the experimental organisms were adequately "contained."'" Although
not legally enforceable, these guidelines were generally followed. 45
136. Cohen, Recombinant DNA: Fact and Fiction, 195 Sc'. 654-55 (1977).
137. Note, supra note 124, at 792-93.
138. Id.
139. General Electric reported the creation of a petroleum consuming microbe
potentially useful in the eradication of oil spills. See NAT'L. GEOGRAPHIC, September
1976, at 374-75.
140. Committee on Recombinant DNA molecules, Potential Biohazards of Re-
combinant DNA Molecules, 185 ScI. 303 (1974).
141. Comment, supra note 129, at 884-85.
142. Id.
143. Wade, Genetics: Conference Sets Strict Controls to Replace Moratorium,
187 Sci. 931-33 (1975). See also Summary Statement of the Asilomar Conference on
Recombinant DNA Molecules, 188 Scr. 991 (1975).
144. Id.
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The Asilomar guidelines served as a basis for the first controls
imposed by the federal government, the National Institutes of Health 4"
Guidelines which govern federally funded research.14 Though both sci-
entists and the general public were consulted in the development of the
guidelines, "' the result remained essentially scientific self-regulation.
Compliance with the NIH Guideline is mandatory only for all NIH
funded research, and compliance in research done by private industries
such as pharmaceutical companies 149 is strictly voluntary.
Recently, HEW Secretary Califano announced that the NIH
Guidelines will be relaxed, due to the fact that the likelihood of harm
now appears more remote than was once believed. The revised guide-
lines, while continuing the ban on six categories of potentially dangerous
research such as that involving deadly disease organisms, will exempt
one-third of the genetic research covered by the present rules. In addi-
tion, the new guidelines will permit the National Institutes of Health
director to grant case-by-case exemptions.
Although the new guidelines will still be mandatory only for feder-
ally financed research, Califano said that, for the first time, the govern-
ment will seek to require the compliance of private industry through the
Food and Drug Administration, which will propose regulations applying
to all the industries it regulates. 5 ' Whether or not the FDA will in fact
impose such regulations, and the impact that these regulations might
have, remain to be seen.
A number of existing laws can be viewed as enabling the federal
government to control some aspects of recombinant DNA research.,',
One statute under which such regulation could be promulgated is the
tional Legal Control, 16 VA. J. INT'L. L. 403, 420 (1976).
146. Hereinafter referred to as NIH.
147. 41 Fed. Reg. 27, 902 (1976) and 41 Fed. Reg. 38, 427 (1976).
148. Roblin, Reflections on Issues Posed by Recombinant DNA Molecule
Technology, 265 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 59 (1976) and Wade, Recombinant DNA:
Guidelines Debated at Public Hearing, 191 Sci. 834 (1976).
149. Grobstein, Recombinant DNA Research: Beyond the NIH Guidelines, 194
Sci. 1133-34 (1976). At least several major pharmaceutical companies are actively
involved in recombinant DNA research. Comment, Considerations in the Regulation
of Biological Research, 126 UNIV. PENN. L. REv. 1420 (1978); Wade, Gene-Splicing:
At Grass-Roots Level a Hundred Flowers Bloom, 195 Sci. 558 (1977).
150. U.S. Set to Relax Guidelines for Gene-Splitting Research, The Washington
Post, Dec. 17, 1978, sec. C at 1. See also The Public Interest in Gene Splitting, The
Washington Post, Jan. 13, 1979 at 18.
151. See generally Balmer, Recombinant DNA: Legal Responses to a New
Biohazard, 7 INVT'L. L. 293, 308 (1977).
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Public Health Services Act.' Under the PHSA, the Surgeon General,
with the approval of the Secretary of HEW, has the power to create and
enforce regulations "as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the
introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases,"'5 3
such as might result from an organism with unknown properties created
via gene-splicing.'
The National Environmental Policy Act 5 gives the federal agen-
cies certain procedural and substantive duties to promote a national
policy of environmental protection. Since recombinant DNA biotech-
nology poses a risk of disrupting the environment through the creation
of new and harmful species, NEPA offers an opportunity for public
review of federally sponsored recombinant DNA research.'
The Toxic Substances Control Act' requires users of potentially
dangerous chemical substances to notify the Environmental Protection
Agency,' which will test the substance's environmental or health risks.
If results suggest imminent danger, the EPA may enact controls as it
deems appropriate. "9
The Occupational Safety and Health Act,"10 administered by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, protects employees
from injury by employment-related toxic substances."' Thus, it could be
used to enforce appropriate safety regulations in laboratories engaged
in work with recombinant DNA."2
For two years, Congress has been struggling to enact legislation to
control recombinant DNA research but, as of yet, no bill has been
passed into law. In February of 1977, Senator Dale Bumpers introduced
a bill entitled The DNA Research Act of 1977,"' which would require
the Secretary of HEW to promulgate guidelines for such research within
152. 42 U.S.C. § 201 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as PHSA].
153. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (1970).
154. Balmer, supra note 151, at 310-11.
155. 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1970 and Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter referred to as
NEPA].
156. Parenteau and Catz, Public Assessment of Biological Technologies: Can
NEPA Answer the Challenge? 64 GEo. L. REv. 679 (1976).
157. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as TSCA].
158. Hereinafter referred to as EPA.
159. 15 U.S.C. §2603(4) (1976).
160. 29 U.S.C. §§651-78 (1970).
161. 29 U.S.C. §655(b)(5) (1970).
162. Balmer, supra note 151, at 312, n. 99.
163. S. 621, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 2272 (1977).
13:1979
27
Porte: Governm nt Regulation Of In Vitro Fertilizatio , Recombinan DNA a
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
Nova Law Journal
ninety days of the bill's enactment."' During and since that time, both
houses have considered a number of similar bills,' the most recent of
which include bills sponsored by Representative Rodgers, 6 ' Senator
Nelson, 167 and Senator Kennedy.'
When Congress may approve legislation in this area and the ulti-
mate nature of the legislation are uncertain. Whether such legislation
will ever be passed has itself become questionable. In a recent letter to
HEW Secretary Califano,' 6' Senator Kennedy threw the recombinant
DNA initiative back into the lap of the administration, suggesting that
Congress is no closer to passing legislation to control recombinant DNA
research than it was two years ago.
B. The Compelling Need for Government Regulation
Under the Commerce Clause
There are three areas of public concern regarding the biotechnology
of recombinant DNA. The most common fear is that a dangerous new
microorganism might escape from the laboratory, causing the death of
millions as the result of a bubonic-like plague.' Since this technique
creates essentially new species of organisms, these organisms could pos-
sibly produce some unnatural or unpredicted substances which might
become serious pests.'
The spread of recombinant organisms might be irreversible, and
thus the possibility that these molecules may escape from laboratories
into the environment must be regarded with great concern. 7 2 The likeli-
hood of such danger is enhanced by the fact that the organism most
commonly used in recombinant DNA research is E. coli., a bacterium
164. id. at§ 4.
165. See, e.g., S.945, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 3699 (1977); S.1217,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 5335 (1977); H.R. 3191, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.,
123 Cong. Rec. 917 (1977); H.R. 4232, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 1552
(1977); H.R. 4759, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 1929 (1977).
166. H.R. 11192, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
167. S. 1217, amend. No. 754, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
168. S. 1217, amend. No. 1713, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
169. Senate Passes Back Gene-Splice Cup, 200 Scl. 1368 (1978).
170. Kilpatrick, Regulation and the Search for Truth, NATION'S BuSINESS, Jan.
1978 at 13-14.
171. Bennett and Gurin, Science That Frightens Scientists, 239 THE ATLANTIC,
Feb. 1977 at 44.
172. See Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, Draft Environmental Impact
Statement, 41 Fed. Reg. 38, 429-31 (1976).
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that inhabits the human gut.'73 Although E. coli. in its natural state is
relatively harmless, the fear is that an escaped pathogenic strain of
recombinant E. coli. would colonize in the intestines of humans.74
Many experts have predicted that the risks involved in recombinant
DNA biotechnology would lead to the above mentioned disasters.' 5
However, such risks are entirely potential and speculative, and have
never, in any way, been demonstrated. 7 ' Scientists have pointed out the
extreme unlikelihood that such risks would be manifested, and have de-
emphasized the dangers of this research.' Nobel Laureate Watson, the
discoverer of DNA's structure, has commented, "the dangers involved
[in recombinant DNA research] are probably no greater than working
in a hospital."' 78
The inescapable conclusion, however, is that the likelihood of dan-
ger resulting from recombinant DNA research is simply not known. 79
Therefore, according to Dr. Philip Handler, president of the National
Academy of Sciences, some regulations of recombinant DNA biotech-
nology are necessary in the interest of the public health and safety."08
At least three recent incidents have demonstrated potential risks
and hazards.'' Yet, the scientific community is in general agreement
that an outright ban is not warranted. The situation has been compared
with the remote possibility of pathogenic organisms being returned to
earth by the Apollo missions."' In that instance, rather than forfeit the
missions, reasonable safeguards were imposed. The potential risk in-
volved in recombinant DNA research is sufficient to justify the imposi-
tion of similar safeguards.
Perhaps the most ominous justification for controlling recombinant
DNA research is the possibility that the technology could be deliber-
ately misused for such purposes as biological warfare., These fears are
173. Comment, supra note 129, at 882.
174. 41 Fed. Reg. 38, 430 (1976).
175. Sinsheimer, An Evolutionary Perspective for Genetic Engineering, 73 N~w
SCIENTIST 150 (1977).
176. Berg, Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecules, 185 Sci. 303
(1974).
177. A British scientist illustrated this view via the use of mathematical probabil-
ities. Holliday, Should Genetic Engineers Be Contained? 73 NEw SCIENTIST 399 (1977).
178. Wade, supra note 143, at 933.
179. Comment, supra note 129, at 883.
180. Kilpatrick, supra note 170, at 14.
181. Wade, Dicing With Nature; Three Narrow Escapes, 195 ScI. 378 (1977).
182. A Scientist-Senator on Recombinant DNA Reasearch, 201 Sci. 15 (1978).
183. Gene War? Reds Play Catch-Up in Genetic Research, Atlanta Journal &
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reminiscent of the waves of controversy that erupted when the tech-
niques of atomic fission and fusion were understood to embrace the
capacity for both social good and social catastrophe. 4 Some might
argue that, in retrospect, the A-bomb should never have been put to-
gether. 1'
The ideal solution would be to impose regulations which would
allow society to reap all the benefits of the technology and risk none of
the disasters. Unfortunately, such a solution might be possible only in
a Utopia. Perhaps the next best remedy would be not to ban recombi-
nant DNA research entirely, but to impose regulations tight enough to
minimize opportunities for deliberate misuse of the technology.
A third appeal for the imposition of governmental regulations has
been made on ethical grounds by those who do not wish to see a world
in which babies are "custom made to order." The argument given in
such cases is that it would be best to prevent the development of such
capabilities by permanently halting all research on recombinant DNA
on the grounds that there are some facts that members of the human
race are better off not knowing.1m
Such appeals are reminiscent of the Promethean187 myth and, car-
ried a step further, echo of Pandora and her box of troubles. Application
of this biotechnology has been regarded as crossing a barrier between
the "will of God" and the acts of humanity by tinkering with the evolu-
tionary process.188 Other critics have suggested that the creation of new
species through gene splicing would upset the precarious "balance of
nature," and result in environmental chaos.189
There is little likelihood that such arguments would be used as
grounds for a case showing compelling need for government regulation.
In the United States the traditional view has been that it is more danger-
ous to live in ignorance than to live with knowledge."' Unlike some
totalitarian governments, it is not the policy of the United States to
regulate ideas simply out of fear of the ideas themselves.' Thus, the
Constitution, Feb. 20, 1977, sec. C at 16, col. 1.
184. Kilpatrick, supra note 170, at 14.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. In Greek mythology, Prometheus created the human race by stealing knowl-
edge that Zeus wanted to keep to himself. In his anger, Zeus punished Prometheus by
nailing him to a mountain and dooming him to the eternal fate of having an eagle tear
out his liver every day, only to have it grow back every night.
188. Kilpatrick, supra note 170, at 14.
189. Sinsheimer, supra note 175, at 150.
190. Kilpatrick, supra note 170, at 14.
191. Id.
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prospects of using the power of government to regulate recombinant
DNA research for the purpose of suppressing ideas that might otherwise
flow from such research are slim.
C. Threatened Ninth Amendment Rights
The right most commonly debated in the field of recombinant
DNA research is the right to freedom of inquiry, which has been held
to be guaranteed by the first and ninth amendments. 1 2 Since pure re-
search has traditionally been unregulated,"' scientists are generally
fearful of the imposition of any legal control,"' and warn of the
"dangers facing modern society if it chooses to foreclose avenues of
knowledge and discovery which might lead to the emancipation of man-
kind from the chains of ignorance and disease."" 5 The prospect of any
controls on research is often equated with the Vatican's inquisition of
Galileo.19
However, inquiry loses its constitutional protection when research
constitutes a threat to the public health, 97 as is the case with recombi-
nant DNA research. Thus, while scientists could claim constitutional
protection in their desire to conduct research free from restrictions, the
degree of their success would be limited by deference to official assess-
ments of the degree to which the public health and environment would
be endangered by the research activity.199 Perhaps the most that scien-
tists could reasonably expect is that regulations ultimately implemented
would be drawn with utmost deference to imposing minimal infringe-
ments on the right to freedom of inquiry.199
The constitutional right to beget children does not imply that this
would include the right to "custom made" or even healthy offspring.
Thus, regulation of recombinant DNA research would not seem to
infringe upon the right to beget children.
Whether or not such regulation would violate the right to have a
government which functions in the public interest and for the common
192. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also text accompanying
notes 30 through 53 supra.
193. Comment, supra note 145, at 417.
194. Lederberg, supra note 50.
195. Comment, supra note 143, at 416.
196. Lederberg, supra note 50, at 596-97.
197. Note, supra note 124, at 836.
198. Comment, supra note 129, at 886-87.
199. Id. at 887.
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good is not an easy issue to resolve. Scientists would undoubtedly con-
tend that such regulations were not in their interest."' Similarly, there
might be those who would maintain that the creation of a race of blond-
haired, blue-eyed giants would indeed be in the common good.2 1
The interests of such special interest groups aside, there is no func-
tion of the government that is more in the public interest and for the
common good than the protection of its citizens, especially from epi-
demic and widespread loss of life. It is certainly in the interest of persons
to survive. Indeed, the survival instinct has been said to be the primary
goal of all liying organisms. Thus, government regulation of recombi-
nant DNA would serve to enhance the right of the people to have a
government which functions in the common interest and for the com-
mon good.
D. Policy Assessment
The above paragraphs suggest that there is indeed a compelling
need for some form of institutionalized preventive control over the re-
search and application of recombinant DNA techniques. Unlike in vitro
technology, application of recombinant DNA techniques posts a poten-
tial threat to the public health and safety that could result from labora-
tory escape or deliberate misuse. While there is no apparent cause for
a ban on such research altogether, the remote possibility of mass con-
tamination is cause for comprehensive governmental regulation of the
area. In the words of G. Raltray Taylor,
I am therefore forced to the conclusion that society will have to control
the pace of research, if it can, and will certainly have to regulate the
release of these new powers. There will have to be a biological "icebox"
in which the new techniques can be placed until society is ready for them
• . . the social consequences . . . could be so disastrous-nothing less
than the breakup of civilization as we know it-that the attempt must be
made.202
The questions which remain to be answered are whether the status quo
satisfies this need and, if not, what course of action should be pursued.
Upon examination it becomes apparent that existing measures are
200. Id.
201. HITLER, MEIN KAMPF (1925).
202. TAYLOR, THE BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB (1968).
32
Nova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol3/iss1/5
Government Regulation of BiotechnologiesI3:1979 97]1
not sufficient. The NIH Guidelines are not legally enforceable,0 3 and
apply only to federally funded research." 4 The PHSA is ill-equipped to
act as a basis of regulation of biological research,"0 ' since the purpose
of the act is to "prevent the spread of disease."2 ' Because of this lan-
guage and the Act's historical usage, an interpretation of the Public
Health Services Act as allowing for control over the spread of a particu-
lar DNA molecule would be an extremely liberal if not implausable
construction.207
The problem with environmental acts such as the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act is that they deal with preventing the discharge of
hazardous substances in harmful quantities.2 18 Since there are no known
safe exposure links of the new organisms which could potentially be
created by gene splicing, such laws provide no useful basis for the for-
mulation of regulations in the area.2°9
The Toxic Substances Control Act would not be an appropriate
vehicle in this area for a variety of reasons. Directed to chemical sub-
stances, the Act would have to be amended to apply also to biological
organisms. 210 The efficiency of this Act as a source of regulation is
diminished by the fact that EPA uses the TSCA as a statute of last
resort when no other statute will solve a pressing problem.', Perhaps
most importantly, the TSCA is used to test chemical substances before
commercial production: with recombinant DNA, the issue is regulation
of the research itself, regardless of possible future exploitation.
212
Finally the Occupational Safety and Health Act does not meet the
need because the Act covers neither government employees nor workers
employed by other federal government agencies,213 two categories in
which recombinant DNA researchers are concentrated.
Having determined that some new form of governmental control
over recombinant DNA research is necessary, the next issue to be re-
203. Supra note 147.
204. Comment, supra note 129, at 885.
205. Comment, supra note 149, at 1437.
206. 42 U.S.C. §264 (1970).
207. Balmer, supra note 151, at 310-12.
208. Kraus, Environmental Carcinogenesis: Regulation on the Frontiers of
Science, 7 ENVT'L L. at 87-89 (1976).
209. Comment, supra note 149, at 1438.
210. Id. at 1436.
21i. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2605(c), 2608(a) and (b) (1976).
212. Comment, supra note 149, at 1436.
213. 29 U.S.C. §§ 652 and 653 (1970).
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solved is whether such legislation should emanate from the federal or
the state and local level." 4 Upon examining the alternatives, there seem
to be compelling reasons for the federal government to totally preempt
regulations in this field." 5
Rather than giving sufficient deference to the scientific right of free
inquiry, states and localities might politicize the decision-making pro-
cess by responding to scare tactics and uninformed public hysteria. 21
Furthermore, it is questionable "whether a system of piecemeal regula-
tion would be effective in protecting the public, for microbes fleeing
from a low-§afeguard locality are unlikely to recognize the political
boundary of an adjacent high-safeguard jurisdiction. ' '2t 7
A final reason for federal control is that local regulators could not
reasonably be expected to have access to the same quality of informa-
tion available to a national body.218 The federal government is best
equipped to keep in step with the most recent scientific developments. 219
If localities were allowed to regulate independently, it is likely that a
time lag in the receipt of current scientific data would result in standards
that would be either too restrictive for optimal research or not restrictive
enough, thus either unnecessarily preventing valuable discoveries or cre-
ating an unreasonable risk to public health.22 For these reasons, it is
not surprising that the scientific community strongly favors federal
rather than state and local regulation.21
The final key issue in implementing regulations on DNA research
is whether Congress should assume responsibility for making the basic
policy decisions, or delegate this responsibility to an administrative
agency.222 In the past, when Congress has legislated in areas of consider-
able controversy, factual uncertainty, and unknown policy impact, it has
214. Comment, supra note 149, at 1424.
215. Id. at 1425.
216. Id. Although the Cambridge Laboratory Experimentation Review Board
and City Council passed useful and legitimate guidelines in this area in 1977, other
localities might not be as "enlightened" as Cambridge. Furthermore, the board itself
believed that federal controls should be implemented. See Cambridge Experimental
Review Board, 33 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 23 (1977) and Culliton, Recombinant DNA:
Cambridge City Council Votes Moratorium, 143 SC. at 301.
217. Comment, supra note 149, at 161.
218. Guilbert, The Relationship Between State and Federal Regulation of Air
Polluting Energy Sources in Oregon, 54 ORE. L. REv. 525 (1975).
219. Comment, supra note 149, at 1426.
220. Id.
221. Gene Legislation: NAS Urges Caution, 211 SC. NEWs 293 (1977).
222. Comment, supra note 149, at 1438.
198 3:1979 1
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deferred to the judgment of administrative agencies, as was the case
regarding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Recently proposed
DNA regulation bills similarly delegate significant decision making to
non-legislative bodies.22' While this pattern of delegation should not be
automatically assumed, it is not practical to expect members of Con-
gress to acquire expertise in all of the wide ranging and complex activi-
ties in which our government is involved today.2
No existing agency has a membership of scientists and laypersons
suited to making the difficult value and policy choices necessary for
adequate regulation of this area. A suitable guide for Congress to
follow in establishing a commission to regulate the field of recombinant
DNA is the composition of other bodies which make policy decisions
of uncertain scientific or technological risks, such as the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission.27
An especially apt membership example, on which the latest House
bill is based, m is the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, which is composed of
eleven persons coming from the fields of "medicine, law, ethics, theol-
ogy, the biological, physical, behavioral and social sciences, philosophy,
humanities, health administration, government, and public affairs. ' 12 A
commission of similar composition would be capable not only of evalu-
ating the technical data involved, but also of representing the public
interest at large in the formulation of recombinant DNA regulations.2
6. CLONING
The technique of cloninge has received a great deal of recent
attention from the media. Unlike in vitro fertilization, which lets nature
223. 42 U.S.C. §2201(b) (1970). This Commission was authorized to impose reg-
ulations on the use of nuclear materials as it deemed necessary to promote the common
defense and protect the public health.
224. H.R. 11192, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 201 (1978); S. 1217, amend. No. 1713,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1978); S. 1217, amend. No. 754, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 481 (1977).
225. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 817, 829 (1977).
226. Comment, supra note 149, at 1440.
227. Id.
228. H.R. 11192, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 218(f) (Supp. 1974).
230. Comment, supra note 149, at 1440.
231. From the Greek klon, meaning twig.
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take its course in a test tube, cloning produces a genetic copy of its single
parent through asexual reproduction."' This technique is facilitated by
the biological fact that every cell in a living organism carries the same
genetic material as every other cell in the organism. The cause of differ-
entiated cell functions is that different genes are "turned on" in, for
example, a blood cell than in a skin cell. 3 In cloning, the nucleus of
an egg or sperm cell, which contains only half the normal number of
chromosomes, is replaced by the nucleus of a body cell containing the
full number of the organism's chromosomes. The cell, having been
"fooled" intq thinking it has been fertilized, begins to divide and devel-
ops as would a normal embryo.24 The end result is an organism biologi-
cally identical to that which donated the nucleus, thus enabling the
production of multiple biological "carbon copies" of any given organ-
ism.?35
This technique has tremendous implications for animal husbandry
and laboratory research. For example, a particular strain of mouse
needed for crucial experiments could be duplicated in mass; prize dairy
cows, sheep and pigs could be mass produced, thus improving the qual-
ity of the world's food supply.?6 Theoretically, it would also be possible
to make clones of great humans, ultimately creating a "superrace" or
perhaps even a new species of human being entirely?217
A. Existing Government Regulation
There are presently no specific constraints on cloning research or
the application of the biotechnology.
B. The Compelling Need for Government Regulation
Under the Commerce Clause
Few people feel that the cloning of mice or of "grade-A" cattle is
a danger creating a compelling need for government regulation. By
contrast, the prospect of cloning humans evokes a sharply different
response of fear, and even hysteria, provoked by thoughts of misuse
232. A Test-Tube Baby is Not a Clone, TIME, July 31, 1978 at 65.
233. Id.
234. Green, supra note 100, at 563.
235. Id.
236. A Test-Tube Baby is Not a Clone, supra note 232.
237. Green, supra note 100, at 563, 573.
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such as tyrannical clones taking over the world. While such scenarios
might not endanger the public health as such, they could cause sufficient
emotional, political and social trauma to justify the imposition of gov-
ernment controls if it is determined that these fears are justified.
An examination of the most recent evidence suggests that these
feared effects of human cloning are unjustified, as the chances for effec-
tive human cloning are minimal. According to Nobel Laureate James
Watson, "there's no future in [cloning]." 8 While researchers in the
field can now effectively clone frogs, the cloning of mammals is much
more complex and, by expert estimations, "a long way off.'"u This is
due in large part to the fact that mammalian eggs are one-tenth to one-
twentieth the size of frog eggs and thus much harder to manipulate. 0AO
Yet, even if scientists were some day able to clone humans, M there
is reason to believe that the effectiveness of the human cloning process
would be minimal. In the first place, unlike domesticated or laboratory
animals, Homo sapiens is a mongrel breed, still containing a number
of harmful or even lethal genesYm While such genes exist in the recessive
state and are thus normally suppressed by dominant normal genes,
certain cloning methods would allow these recessives to express them-
selves, thus causing deformities, genetic illness, or even the death of the
clone.243
The second probable obstacle to effective human cloning stems
from the difference between genotype 24' and phenotype.2 5 Cloning
would produce a person genetically identical to its nuclear donor. 26
However, the genotype of an organism alone does not completely deter-
mine the phenotype, which is instead the result of the interaction be-
tween the genotype and the environment.247 The same genotype can
produce very different phenotypes in the presence of variant physical
and social influences .2 s Thus, even if human clones were produced, the
238. A Test-Tube Baby is Not a Clone, supra note 232.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Hudock, supra note 116, at 555.
242. Id.
243. A Test-Tube Baby is Not a Clone, supra note 232.
244. Genetic make-up of an organism; All genes present in the nucleus of a cell,
both dominant and expressed, recessive and unexpressed.
245. Minifest characteristics of an organism; dominant and expressed traits
such as skin color and blood type that result from both heredity and environment.
246. Hudock, supra note 116, at 555.
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clones would not necessarily exhibit the desired traits of the nuclear
donor.249
Until conflicting and valid evidence or conditions are at hand, the
difficulties and probable ineffectiveness of human cloning do not pose
risks which would compel government regulation of technology. The
effects of such efforts would apparently be benign. In the words of
Watson,
What's to be gained? A carbon copy of yourself? Oh, if the Shah of
Iran wanted to spend his oil millions on cloning himself, that's fine with
me. But if either of my young sons wanted to become a scientist I would
suggest he stay away from research in cloning humans. There's no future
in it.210
C. Threatened Ninth Amendment Rights
Since there is not presently a compelling need for government regu-
lation of cloning, individual rights in this area could be fully exercised
without the threat of infringement. Researchers could exercise their
right to freedom of inquiry. Results of such research, such as improve-
ments in the world's food supply, would be in the public interest and
for the common good. While it could be argued that cloning oneself is
not protected by the right to beget children,251 there is no reason for
restricting this benign activity. As it is the right of individuals to have
full access to the decision-making process, the decision whether or not
to clone oneself should be left with the people.
D. Policy Assessment
The cloning biotechnology should be conducted without the imposi-
tion of government regulations. If future evidence suggests that effective
human cloning is indeed possible, the need for government regulation
should at that time be reassessed. Until such a time, the status quo
should be maintained.
249. Id.
250. A Test-Tube Baby is Not a Clone, supra note 232.
251. Cloning is asexual reproduction. Sexual reproduction is implicit in the defini-
tion of beget.
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Government Regulation of Biotechnologies
7. CONCLUSION
Once a technology is developed, it is very difficult to "turn off. ' ' z52
It is unlikely that society could completely prevent the emergence of
the applications of new genetic knowledge even if it so desired. The best
that can be hoped for is that the consequences of these technologies
be carefully considered, and that they be wisely used.23
While some government regulations will always be necessary, in the
words of Commerce Secretary Jerry Jasinowski, "our regulatory system
is out of control."' ' The excessive regulation by our bulging bureauc-
racy is expensive and unnecessary, and our nation needs desperately to
find a reasonable midpoint between too much regulation and too little.
Recent legislation freeing the airline industry from federal regulation,
the first instance of deregulating a major industry in decades, has re-
sulted in better passenger service and lower prices.255
This experience should serve as a lesson that government regula-
tion is not the best solution to all problems. It is true that movement
toward the "brave new world" should be the result of conscious decision
by society, taking into consideration the ultimate social consequences.
However, there is a place in this scenario for both government regu-
lation and individual, marketplace decision-making.
Finally, this article has demonstrated that these biotechnological
issues can indeed be considered in a rational and systematic manner.
By viewing their implications from a constitutional perspective, with a
focus on the compelling need for government regulation under the com-
merce clause balanced against threatened ninth amendment rights,
reasonable policy decisions can be made. This kind of logical assess-
ment has unfortunately been markedly absent in the past. Hopefully, it
will become the rule rather than the exception in the future.
However, the establishment of the much discussed "science
court," z which would seek to resolve close technical issues in an adver-
sary setting, is unnecessary. Scientific "facts" in many areas, such as
DNA research, are conjectural and not amenable to resolution in an
adversary process.21
252. Green, supra note 100, at 574.
253. Id. at 575.
254. Palmer, The Rising Risks of Regulation, TME, Nov. 27, 1978 at 85-87.
255. Flying the Crowded Skies, TIME, Aug. 14, 1978 at 50-55. See also Help for
Full Fares, TIME, Oct. 16, 1978 at 90-91.
256. Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 MICH. LAW REV. 1058 (1977).
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Recombinant DNA research should be regulated by a newly
created administrative agency. However, the biotechologies of in vitro
fertilization and cloning should be left unregulated. Controversies
arising from individual applications of these techniques could be
handled in the traditional courts of law,2s facilitated by the eventual
evolution of a body of case law pertaining specifically to these bio-
technological questions.
258. At least two such cases have already been resolved. See Mack v. Califano,
447 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that government scientists cannot be prelimi-
narily enjoined from recombinant DNA research which is in accordance with National
Institutes of Health Guidelines); see also DelVio v. Presbyterian Hospital, Facts on
File October 13, 1978 at 770 (Federal court jury awarded Doris and Don DelVio
$37,000 for emotional stress suffered when their laboratory-conceived baby was halted
the day after its test tube feihilization).
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